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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves the unauthorized use of grain silo 
rooftop space by LP Broadband, Inc. (hereafter "LP 
Broadband"), for the purpose of installation and operation of 
internet antennae and related equipment. The rooftop space is 
now owned by Lincoln Land Company, LLC (hereafter "Lincoln 
Land) and was leased by Lincoln Land to General Mills 
Operations, Inc. (hereafter "General Mills"), beginning June, 
2010. See Lease, R. p. 281-88. 
Prior to Lincoln Land's purchase of the grain silos in 
2010, General Mills leased the grain silos from Evan's Grain 
and Elevator Company, the prior owner of the grain silos. 
On March 20, 2000, General Mills signed a "Roof-top 
Rental Agreement", renting rooftop space on the grain silos 
to MicroServ (LP Broadband's predecessor in interest), with 
rent in the amount of $50.00 per month. See Roof-top Rental 
Agreement, R. p. 27 (hereafter "the 2000 Sublease 
Agreement"). Pursuant to the 2000 Sublease Agreement, General 
Mills allowed LP Broadband to utilize the Rooftops as a 
location for placement of internet antennae for a period "of 
no less than 3 years, and up to 5 years with annual renewals 
after the first 3 years." See 2000 Sublease Agreement. R. p. 
27. 
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For purposes of this appeal, and giving the greatest 
possible benefit of interpretation to LP Broadband, this 
Court should assume that the "up to 5 years with annual 
renewals" is in addition to the initial 3 years of guaranteed 
utilization. Using the interpretation most favorable to LP 
Broadband, the 2000 Sublease Agreement could extend at most 
for 8 years, or until March 20, 2008. Lincoln Land's 
Complaint seeks the disgorgement by LP Broadband of unjust 
enrichment benefits received after July, 2010 (See Complaint, 
para. 7, R. p. 17), more than two years after the last 
possible expiration date of the 2000 Sublease Agreement. 
Other than the 2000 Sublease Agreement, no valid, executed 
sublease agreement has been provided by LP Broadband. 
During June, 2010, Lincoln Land, as the new owner of the 
grain silos, leased the silos to General Mills. See Affidavit 
of Doyle H. Beck, dated November 10, 2015, Para. 3, R. p. 44. 
Such lease agreement specifically prohibited General Mills 
from subletting the property or any part thereof without the 
prior written consent of Lincoln Land. Id., Para. 4, R. p. 
45. In June, 2010, Lincoln Land was not aware of LP 
Broadband's continuing unauthorized occupancy of the 
Rooftops. Id., Para 5, R. p. 45. 
Between July, 2010 and April 22, 2014, LP Broadband 
utilized internet antennae equipment on the Rooftops without 
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any authorization from Lincoln Land and without any payment 
to Lincoln Land for such use. See Responses to Requests for 
Admission 1-5 attached to the Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, 
dated November 10, 2015, as Exhibit 'A', R. p. 36-38. 
During litigation, LP Broadband disclosed to Lincoln 
Land two unsigned documents, one entitled "Antenna Space 
Lease Agreement" and the other entitled "Tower Agreement". R. 
p. 42-43. The Antenna Space Lease Agreement purports to 
authorize the utilization of the Rooftops from June 1, 2004 
through June 1, 2009, with automatic annual renewals 
(hereinafter referred to as "the 2004 Sublease Agreement") . 
Id. The Tower Agreement purports to authorize the utilization 
of the Rooftops from April 20, 2013 through March 31, 2018 
(hereinafter referred to as "the 2013 Sublease Agreement") . 
Id. These 2004 and 2013 sublease agreements were never signed 
by LP Broadband, MicroServ, General Mills, Inc., General 
Mills Operations, LLC, Evans Grain & Elevator Co., or Lincoln 
Land. Id. 
Lincoln Land filed a Complaint on July 20, 2015, seeking 
an order requiring LP Broadband (successor by merger to 
MicroServ) to disgorge the unjust profits realized by the 
unauthorized use of Lincoln Land's real property. See 
Complaint, R. p. 15-27. LP Broadband was unjustly enriched by 
its unauthorized use of Lincoln Land's property to locate 
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internet antennae equipment and by selling internet access to 
its customers. Id. 
On March 4, 2016, Lincoln Land filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment RE: Unjust Enrichment Claim, seeking 
among other things, a determination that LP Broadband was 
unjustly enriched, but leaving the amount of such unjust 
enrichment for determination at a later date. R. p. 209-11. 
On March 16, 2016, LP Broadband filed its own Motion for 
Summary Judgment, seeking a determination that no benefit was 
conferred by Lincoln Land to LP Broadband. R. p. 239-40. Each 
party thereafter filed opposing and supporting briefing as 
permitted by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A joint hearing on these Motions was held on April 13, 
2016. On May 18, 2016, the District Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Lincoln Land's Motion 
and granting LP Broadband's Motion. R. p. 493-504. Judgment 
was entered August 19, 2016. R. p. 512-14. 
On September 28, 2016, Lincoln Land appealed the 
District Court's Judgment and Memorandum Decision and Order. 
R. p. 575-79. The District Court subsequently denied LP 
Broadband's request for attorney fees. R. p. 560-71. On 
November 15, 2016, LP Broadband filed a cross appeal from the 
District Court's denial of attorney fees. R. p. 584-87. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
a. The District Court erred in granting Summary 
Judgment to LP Broadband by determining that no 
benefit was conferred to LP Broadband by Lincoln 
Land Company. 
b. The District Court erred in determining that the 
standard to establish a claim for unjust enrichment 
requires that the benefit conferred upon the party 
unjustly enriched must be provided directly by the 
party seeking to recover. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO LP BROADBAND BY DETERMINING THAT NO BENEFIT WAS 
CONFERRED TO LP BROADBAND BY LINCOLN LAND COMPANY. 
The first issue on appeal addresses the District 
Court's determination that Lincoln Land did not confer a 
benefit when LP Broadband used the Rooftop Space without 
authorization from Lincoln Land. In its Memorandum Decision 
and Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, the District 
Court made the legal determination that "General Mills, not 
Lincoln Land, conferred the benefit by granting LP 
Broadband permission to use the property's rooftop area." 
R. p. 500. As a matter of law, General Mills had no legal 
or contractual authority to confer access to the Rooftops 
to LP Broadband. The Lease between Lincoln Land and General 
Mills specifically stated that "Tenant will not sublet the 
Property, or any part thereof, and will not assign this 
Lease or any interest therein, nor permit this Lease to be 
transferred in any manner without the prior written consent 
of Landlord in each and every case of underletting or 
assignment .... " R. p. 282. Without Lincoln Land's written 
approval, General Mills had no legal authority to confer 
any interest in the rooftops to LP Broadband. 
Idaho Code Section 55-607 states that "A grant made by 
the owner of an estate for life or years, purporting to 
8 
transfer a greater estate than he could lawfully 
transfer ... passes to the grantee all the estate which the 
grantor could lawfully transfer." Any attempt by General 
Mills ( as owner of an estate for years) to confer the 
benefit of occupancy of the rooftop space without Lincoln 
Land's approval was in violation of Idaho Code Section 55-
607 and was an illegal attempt to transfer a greater estate 
than General Mills could lawfully transfer. Because General 
Mills had no legal capacity to confer rooftop occupancy to 
LP Broadband, no estate could be transferred by General 
Mills to LP Broadband. Any claim that General Mills 
conferred such a benefit should have been rejected by the 
District Court. LP Broadband's use of Lincoln Land's 
property must necessarily constitute an appropriation from 
Lincoln Land, because only Lincoln Land had the legal and 
contractual authority to confer the use of Lincoln Land's 
property to LP Broadband. 
The District Court relied heavily upon Med. Recovery 
Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 
Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802 (2014), reh'g denied (Sept. 15, 
2014). The District Court stated: 
[I]t was not [Lincoln Land's] conduct that 
conferred a benefit on [LP Broadband] . General 
Mills, not Lincoln Land, conferred the benefit by 
granting LP Broadband permission to use the 
property's rooftop area. If ... General Mill's 
decision to permit LP Broadband to use the 
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rooftop was in violation of the Lease Agreement, 
that decision is analogous to WSEC' s mistake in 
MRS. Such a mistake or alleged breach of contract 
does not alter the fact that it was General 
Mills, not Lincoln Land, which conferred the 
benefit. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, p. 8 (emphasis added), R. p. 500. The District 
Court failed to recognize that the mistake in MRS related 
to personal property (money), not an interest in real 
property. Under Idaho Code 55-607, a tenant cannot 
"mistakenly" transfer a greater estate in real property 
than the tenant possesses and the holding in MRS is easily 
distinguished under applicable law. 
The District Court also relied upon Brewer v. 
Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 184 
P. 3d 860 (2008). The District Court interpreted the Brewer 
decision to mean that the "Idaho Supreme Court did not 
consider [the Defendant's] use of the property without the 
[Plaintiff's] authorization to be sufficient, by itself, to 
establish that the [Plaintiff] conferred a benefit on [the 
Defendant]." See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions 
for Summary Judgment, p. 10, R. p. 502. The District Court 
here acknowledged "that, unlike the plaintiff in Brewer, 
Lincoln Land has clearly supported its allegation of a 
below-market value lease, sufficient to create a question 
of fact on that issue. The value of the lease, however, 
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relates more directly to the third element in a cause of 
action for unjust enrichment." Id. The District Court, 
relying upon Brewer, held that any unauthorized use of real 
property (trespass) will only give rise to a claim for 
unjust enrichment where the unauthorized use was conferred 
upon the trespasser by the lawful owner (which would of 
necessity mean the use is no longer unauthorized). Under 
the District Court's holding, if the trespasser received 
"permission" from a third-party intermeddler who lacks 
legal authority to grant such permission, no cause of 
action by the owner for unjust enrichment arises. This 
would create a loophole whereby any unjust enrichment claim 
could be thwarted simply by claiming a third-party 
interloper authorized the use of the owner's property. 
The first element of a prima facie case for unjust 
enrichment requires that "there was a benefit conferred 
upon the defendant by the plaintiff". Steven sen v. 
Windermere Real Estate/Capital Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 
827, 275 p.3d 839, 842 (2012). As specifically noted by LP 
Broadband, "'A person confers a benefit upon another if he 
or she gives the other some interest in money, land, or 
possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the 
request of the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or 
in any other way adds to the other's advantage.' 42 C.J.S. 
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Implied Contracts § 9 (2013)." See Defendant's Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6 (emphasis 
added), R. p. 246. As noted in Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 
109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647 (Ct.App. 1985), a defendant 
"should be required to make restitution of or for property 
or benefits received, retained, or appropriated . ... " Idaho 
Lumber, Inc., 109 Idaho at 746 (emphasis added). It is 
undisputed that LP Broadband received, retained and 
appropriated Lincoln Land's real property interest when 
after June, 2010 it installed and utilized antennae 
equipment on the rooftop space of Lincoln Land's grain 
silos without Lincoln Land's authorization. Providing that 
unjust enrichment may result from appropriation of property 
or benefits necessarily negates any requirement that the 
benefit must be authorized by the owner through conferral. 
LP Broadband was conferred a property use benefit and 
was advantaged at the expense of Lincoln Land when LP 
Broadband received, retained, appropriated, occupied and 
utilized Lincoln Land's property without authorization or 
permission from Lincoln Land. The two cases relied upon by 
the District Court should be distinguished from the present 
action for the following reasons: 
a. Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville 
Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 336 
P.3d 802 (2014). 
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The facts in Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. 
Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., are easily 
distinguished from Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment claim. 
In Medical Recovery Services, LLC, wages garnished from a 
debtor's employer by Medical Recovery Services, LLC, were 
mistakenly sent by the employer to Bonneville Billing and 
Collections, Inc., who also was owed money by the debtor. 
Medical Recovery Services then filed an unjust enrichment 
claim against Bonneville Billing. The Idaho Supreme Court 
determined "that Medical Recovery Services did not confer 
any direct benefit on Bonneville Billings and Collections." 
See Medical Recovery Services, Inc., 157 Idaho at 399. This 
was technically true because the Court found that the 
benefit was conferred by the employer who sent the money 
directly to Bonneville Billings, and no benefit was 
conferred by Medical Recovery Services. Id. The 'benefit 
conferred' was personal property (money) which the employer 
mistakenly sent to the wrong collection agency. The basis 
of the holding was that at the time of the employer's 
mistake, Medical Recovery Services had no ownership 
interest in the personal property (money). 
The District Court in the present action erred when it 
focused on the conduct of the parties (" ... it was the 
plaintiff's conduct that conferred the benefit on the 
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defendant." See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions 
for Summary Judgment, p. 8 (emphasis added), R. p. 500), 
rather than who actually owned the benefit (money) at the 
time it was conferred. Rather than focusing on the conduct 
of the parties, the correct analysis must focus on who had 
legal rights to the benefit being conferred. In Medical 
Recovery Services, at the time of conferral the benefit 
(money) belonged to the employer/employee and was never in 
the possession or ownership of Medical Recovery Services. 
Until the employer made payment, the funds belonged to the 
employer and Medical Recovery Services had no ownership 
interest in the funds which Medical Recovery Services could 
confer. Medical Recovery Services had no right to demand 
possession of the specific money conferred by the employer. 
In the present action, the 'benefit conferred' was the 
right to occupy and utilize Lincoln Land's real property 
interest in the silo rooftops. General Mills had a lease 
with Lincoln Land to occupy and utilize the property, but 
Lincoln Land retained the right of subletting to all 
others, " ... in any manner ... in each and every case .... " See 
Affidavit of Doyle Beck, Exhibit 'A', para. 11, R. p. 383. 
General Mills did not have the legal right to confer the 
benefit of rooftop occupancy upon LP Broadband because 
General Mills did not possess the right to transfer the 
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Rooftops under General Mills' lease agreement with Lincoln 
Land. See Affidavit of Jim Rooney, para. 6 and 8, R. p. 
425. When LP Broadband received, retained and thereby 
appropriated Lincoln Land's real property occupancy right, 
a benefit was conferred upon LP Broadband which actually 
belonged to Lincoln Land. General Mills cou1d not confer a 
right which General Mills did not legally possess and 
General Mills expressly informed LP Broadband that any 
rooftop lease required approval of the owner of the 
property. Id. 
In Medical Recovery Services, Inc., the Supreme Court 
noted that a mistake on the part of the employer was the 
source of the personal property benefit (money) which was 
conferred. 157 Idaho at 399. Contrary to the findings of 
the District Court here, the mistake in Medical Recovery 
Services is not analogous to the present facts. In Medical 
Recovery Services, the personal property (money) flowed 
directly from the employer to Bonneville Billing and 
Collections. There was no contract or protected interest in 
the personal property which prevented the employer from 
making that "conferral by mistake". In the present action, 
General Mills did not possess the contractual right to 
sublease the rooftops and Idaho Code Section 55-607 
specifically prevents "mistaken" transfers of real property 
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interests by tenants. General Mills could not mistakenly or 
intentionally confer any real property benefit upon LP 
Broadband. See Para. 11 of Lease, attached as Exhibit 'A' 
to the Affidavit of Doyle Beck, R. p. 383. In addition, the 
2000 sublease upon which LP Broadband relies had expired 
years before the subject time period. See Exhibit 'C' to 
the Complaint, R. p. 27; see also Affidavit of Jim Rooney, 
para. 4, R. p. 424. This Court should not sanction the 
appropriation of real property rights by trespass and the 
resulting unjustified enrichment, simply because an 
unauthorized third party was involved. 
b. Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 
145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008). 
The facts in Brewer are also distinguishable from the 
facts in this action. In Brewer, a co-tenant acting as 
manager of real property, leased property to the Defendant. 
Another co-tenant brought an action for unjust enrichment 
based upon the Defendant's use of the property at a below 
market lease rate. " [The District Court] noted that there 
were no facts in the record suggesting [the Defendant] had 
received a below-market lease or that it had received a 
benefit that would be inequitable for it to retain." 
Brewer, 145 Idaho at 739 (emphasis added). In response to 
the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial 
Court held that Brewer "failed to point to a single fact in 
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the record ... that creates a genuine issue of material fact" 
and "merely made unsubstantiated allegations relating to 
the lease." Brewer, 145 Idaho at 740 (emphasis added). 
Brewer does not stand for the proposition asserted by 
the District Court here, to wit: that the use by trespass 
of real property owned by the Plaintiff is not a direct 
benefit to the Defendant. The Brewer Court granted the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, determining that 
the Plaintiff only made allegations, unsupported by facts, 
regarding the elements of unjust enrichment. In fact, the 
Supreme Court identified the remedies available in a 
situation where a co-tenant leased the common property of 
another co-tenant: "Such a contract may be voidable by the 
non-leasing tenants in common. Excluded tenants in common 
may also seek the fair rental value of comm.on property. 
Finally, co-tenants ousted by the lease of the common 
property (or some portion thereof) to another party by one 
co-tenant may seek partition of the property." Brewer, 145 
Idaho at 738 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
present action is not a case of two co-tenants managing 
common property, but of a landlord being deprived of its 
occupancy interest in its real property by a non-tenant, 
occupying without the landlord's authorization. 
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The District Court here was correct when it opined 
that the "value of the lease ... relates more directly to the 
third element in a cause of action for unjust enrichment." 
See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, p. 10, R. p. 502. However, the District Court 
erred in relying upon the Brewer decision to hold that the 
use of real property alone was insufficient to meet the 
first element of a claim for unjust enrichment. In Brewer, 
the Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the lower court and 
found that "there were no facts in the record suggesting 
[the defendant] had received a below-market lease or that 
it had received a benefit that would be inequitable for it 
to retain." Brewer, 145 Idaho at 739. The Brewers "provided 
no evidence that they had conferred a benefit on [the 
defendant] or that it had received a benefit. Instead, they 
merely asserted that [the defendant's] use of the land was 
a benefit and that it was receiving a below market lease." 
Id. 
The District Court here acknowledged that Lincoln Land 
clearly supported its allegation of a below-market value 
lease, sufficient to create a question of fact on that 
issue. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for 
Summary Judgment, p. 10, R. p. 502. Where the Plaintiffs in 
Brewer were deficient in establishing issues of fact, 
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Lincoln Land has met its burden. Not only has LP Broadband 
admitted to occupying Lincoln Land's property, (see R. p. 
188-90, Amended Answer, para. 4 and Affirmative Defense 
'd': "Defendant occupied the premises"), LP Broadband has 
admitted to placing internet antennae equipment and 
profiting by selling access to the internet through the 
equipment placed on Lincoln Land's property. See R. p. 36, 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Request for 
Discovery, Request for Admission No. 1, attached to the 
Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller, dated November 10, 2015: 
"Response No. 1. Admits installation of internet or other 
antenna equipment on the rooftop of property .... Defendant 
further admits that the equipment remained upon the grain 
elevators thereafter pursuant to a contract/lease with 
General Mills, until removal". 
The facts supporting Lincoln Land's cause of action go 
well beyond the mere allegations which allowed the Brewer 
Court to dismiss that action. Lincoln Land has provided 
factual evidence of the value of the benefit, including 
below market rent and the monthly revenue received by LP 
Broadband. See Affidavit of Paul Fuller, Ex. A, R. p. 396 
(sealed); see also Affidavit of Jim Rooney, para. 9, R. p. 
426; see also Affidavit of Doyle Beck, para. 5, R. p. 379. 
Relying on its faulty Brewer analysis, the District Court 
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here concluded that appropriation of another's real 
property interest is not unjust enrichment if a third party 
has unlawfully "conferred" the occupancy benefit. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, p. 10, R. p. 502. If such is the law, then any 
action for unjust enrichment by appropriation may be 
defeated by simply claiming a third party intermeddler 
authorized the use of the property. This was not the 
holding of the Brewer decision, and to the extent that the 
Brewer decision may be interpreted in this fashion, it is 
requested that the Idaho Supreme Court provide 
clarification. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
STANDARD TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT REQUIRES 
THAT THE BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON THE PARTY UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
MUST BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY BY THE PARTY SEEKING TO RECOVER. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for 
Summary Judgment, the District Court cited to the following 
case law regarding claims for unjust enrichment: 
"Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant 
receives a benefit which would be inequitable to 
retain without compensating the plaintiff to the 
extent that retention is unjust." Vanderford Co. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 
(2007) (citing Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving 
Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990)). 
A prima f acie case for unjust enrichment exists 
where: "(l) there was a benefit conferred upon the 
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the 
defendant of such benefit; and ( 3) acceptance of 
the benefit under circumstances that would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit 
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without payment to the plaintiff for the value 
thereof." Stevenson v. Windermere Real 
Estate/Capital Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 827, 275 
P.3d 839, 842 (2012) (qu'oting Vanderford Co., 144 
Idaho at 558, 165 P.3d at 272). "A person confers a 
benefit upon another if he or she gives the other 
some interest in money, land, or possessions, 
performs services beneficial to or at the request 
of the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or 
in any other way adds to the other's advantage." 42 
C.J.S. Implied Contracts§ 9 (2013). 
See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, p. 6, R. p. 498 (emphasis added); citing Medical 
Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, 
Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 398, 336 P.3d 802, 805 (2014), reh'g 
denied (Sept. 15, 2014). 
The District Court went on to hold that "it was not the 
plaintiff's conduct that conferred the benefit on the 
defendant", but it was General Mills who "conferred the 
benefit by granting LP Broadband permission to use the 
property's rooftop area." See Memorandum Decision and Order 
Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, p. 8, R. p. 500. As 
discussed above, General Mills had no legal authority to 
confer such benefit. In its analysis of the Brewer decision, 
the District Court held that use of property without 
authorization (appropriation) is insufficient to establish a 
conferral of a benefit for purposes of the first element of 
an unjust enrichment claim, imposing a requirement that the 
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benefit must be intentionally conferred directly by the 
plaintiff. 
The District Court requirement of a direct link between 
plaintiff and defendant is not supported by Idaho case law 
regarding unjust enrichment. As noted in Idaho Lumber, Inc. 
v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647 (Ct.App. 1985), a 
defendant "should be required to make restitution of or for 
property or benefits received, retained, or 
appropriated .... " Idaho Lumber, Inc., 109 Idaho at 746 
(emphasis added). By the inclusion of the term 
"appropriated", the Court made it clear that there is no 
requirement that a benefit be willingly conferred directly 
by the plaintiff. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 
"Appropriate" is defined as: "To make a thing one's own; to 
make a thing the subject of property; to exercise dominion 
over an object to the extent, and for the purpose, of 
making it subserve one's own proper use or pleasure." See 
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1990. By inclusion of the 
term "appropriated", the Idaho Supreme Court held that a 
claim for unjust enrichment may be established without any 
intentional act on the part of the plaintiff when the 
defendant has taken a benefit to serve the defendant's own 
use or pleasure. 
22 
Idaho Lumber is consistent with the Restatement 
( Third) of Res ti tut ion and Unjust Enrichment, § 4 0, which 
states that one who "obtains a benefit by an act of 
trespass or conversion, by comparable interference with 
other protected interests in tangible property, or in 
consequence of such an act by another, is liable in 
restitution to the victim of the wrong." ( emphasis added) . 
It is not material whether LP Broadband appropriated 
Lincoln Land's real property rights or if General Mills is 
the actual wrongdoer. In either case, LP Broadband has, by 
wrongful conferral or appropriation, received a benefit it 
cannot justly retain. The principles set forth in 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
§40 were recently adopted in Montana, with the Supreme 
Court of Montana stating as follows: "Unjust enrichment may 
arise from interference with real property when the 
defendant has made valuable use of the plaintiff's property 
without paying for it." Christian v. Atl. Richfield Co., 
380 Mont. 495, 358 P.3d 131, 150 (Mont., 2015); citing 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 
§40, cmt. c. In Christian, a mining smelter emitted smoke 
and fumes containing arsenic and other toxic materials. Id. 
Particles of these materials settled on neighboring lands. 
Id. The owners of the neighboring lands brought suit, 
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claiming among other causes of action, unjust enrichment. 
Id. The Montana Supreme Court stated that an unjust 
enrichment had occurred ("This is exactly the circumstance 
alleged here.") , but dismissed the cause of action based 
upon the applicable statute of limitations. Id. 
It is clear that LP Broadband appropriated Lincoln 
Land's property interests when it continued to use Lincoln 
Land's property, knowing it did not have owner 
authorization. The token $50 per month rental rate paid to 
General Mills was well below market rates and only adds to 
the evidence establishing that LP Broadband knew it was 
appropriating Lincoln Land's property interest without 
authorization. If I agree to rent the Brooklyn Bridge from 
a local vendor for $50 per month, it is self-evident that I 
am renting at a below market rate. 
When the District Court imposed a requirement that the 
plaintiff must perform some intentional act to confer a 
benefit for purposes of a claim for unjust enrichment, the 
District Court erred. No such requirement has been imposed 
by applicable Idaho case law. As noted above, "Unjust 
enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which 
would be inequitable to retain without compensating the 
plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." Vanderford 
Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271 (2007). 
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The central issue is receipt of a benefit by defendant, not 
intentional conferral by the plaintiff. This action is a 
clear case where LP Broadband has received a benefit by 
appropriation which is inequitable for LP Broadband to 
retain, without compensating Lincoln Land for the 
unauthorized use of Lincoln Land's property interest in the 
grain silo rooftops. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the District Court erred 
when the District Court determined that no benefit was 
conferred to LP Broadband by Lincoln Land Company. It is 
undisputed that LP Broadband occupied property owned by 
Lincoln Land. It is undisputed that LP Broadband benefitted 
by the use of Lincoln Land's property. General Mills did 
not have authority under the lease between General Mills 
and Lincoln Land to authorize LP Broadband to occupy 
Lincoln Land's property. Under these facts, it is clear 
that LP Broadband appropriated Lincoln Land's property 
interest without authorization. "Unjust enrichment occurs 
where a defendant receives a benefit which would be 
inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to 
the extent that retention is unjust." See Medical Recovery 
Servs., LLC, 157 Idaho at 398, 336 P.3d at 805 (2014); see 
also Vanderford Co., 144 Idaho at 557, 165 P.3d at 271. LP 
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Broadband has appropriated a benefit which would be 
inequitable to retain without compensating Lincoln Land, 
the very scenario for which unjust enrichment claims are 
established. 
This Court should also hold that the District Court 
erred when the District Court determined that direct 
conferral of a benefit was required in order to assert a 
claim for unjust enrichment. This requirement is not 
supported by Idaho case law, which allows unjust enrichment 
claims for benefits "received, retained, or appropriated .... " 
Idaho Lumber, Inc., 109 Idaho at 746. This requirement is 
also not supported by the Restatement, which recognizes 
unjust enrichment claims against a defendant who "obtains a 
benefit by an act of trespass or conversion, by comparable 
interference with other protected interests in tangible 
property, or in consequence of such an act by another .... " 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 
§40. Requiring a direct link between the victim and 
wrongdoer only serves as a loophole to deprive the victim 
of a just recovery. Under such a standard, unjust 
enrichment claims can be defeated by simply claiming that a 
third party provided a benefit which rightfully belonged to 
the victim, exactly as LP Broadband has done in the present 
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case. This is not a standard which this Court should set in 
Idaho. 
The District Court accepted the arguments presented by 
LP Broadband, which allowed the District Court to focus 
solely on the conduct of the parties. By focusing on the 
conduct of the parties, rather than the benefits received, 
the District Court ignored the underlying theory of unjust 
enrichment: The Defendant received a benefit which it would 
be inequitable to retain without compensation to the owner. 
The right to occupy real property belongs to the owner, to 
determine who may occupy and who must leave. LP Broadband 
never received lawful permission to use Lincoln Land's 
property, and received a valuable benefit which rightfully 
belonged to Lincoln Land. Unjust enrichment is designed to 
deter these appropriations by requiring the entity unjustly 
benefitted to disgorge the profits resulting from such 
unauthorized use. Lincoln Land's rights to all benefits of 
its real property must be protected from unauthorized use. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this __2Q_ day of April, 2017. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC 
Attorney for Lincoln Land Company, LLC 
27 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief by 
U.S. Mail or hand delivery to the attorneys listed below on this _l_Q_ day of April, 2017: 
Ronald L. Swafford 
Larren K. Covert 
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C. 
655 S. Woodruff Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Alexander P. McLaughlin 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Mark R. Fuller 
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES 
28 
